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Deepfakes: Trick or Treat? 
ABSTRACT 
Although manipulations of visual and auditory media are as old as the media themselves, the 
recent entrance of deepfakes has marked a turning point in the creation of fake content. Powered 
by latest technological advances in AI and machine learning, they offer automated procedures to 
create fake content that is harder and harder to detect to human observers. The possibilities to 
deceive are endless, including manipulated pictures, videos and audio, that will have large 
societal impact. Because of this, organizations need to understand the inner workings of the 
underlying techniques, as well as their strengths and limitations. This article provides a working 
definition of deepfakes together with an overview of the underlying technology. We classify 
different deepfake types: photo (face- and body-swapping), audio (voice-swapping, text to 
speech), video (face-swapping, face-morphing, full body puppetry) and audio & video (lip-
synching), and identify risks and opportunities to help organizations think about the future of 
deepfakes. Finally, we propose the R.E.A.L. framework to manage deepfake risks: Record 
original content to assure deniability, Expose deepfakes early, Advocate for legal protection and 
Leverage trust to counter credulity. Following these principles, we hope that our society can be 
more prepared to counter the deepfake tricks as we appreciate its treats. 
 
Keywords: deepfakes; fake news; artificial intelligence (AI); machine learning (ML); deep 
neural networks (DNN) 
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Deepfakes: Trick or Treat? 
1. WHAT ARE DEEPFAKES? 
Analog and digital fakes are not new, and methods for media manipulation are likely as old as 
the media themselves. But, did you watch the 2019 video of President Obama swearing during a 
public service announcement? How about the one of Mark Zuckerberg announcing that he’s 
deleting Facebook, which attracted 72 million views and led to outrage among viewers who 
believed the content to be authentic? Or the Willy Wonka & the Chocolate Factory clip in which 
Ryan Reynolds, the Deadpool star, takes Gene Wilder’s place? If you did, and even for a 
moment you believed their surprising content to be genuine, then you were tricked. Welcome to 
deepfakes - the newest in fakes.  
Deepfakes leverage powerful techniques from machine learning and artificial intelligence  
to manipulate or generate visual and audio content with a high potential to deceive. 
The phenomenon gained its name from an anonymous user of the platform Reddit, who went by 
the name “deepfakes” (deep learning + fakes), and who shared the first deepfakes by placing 
unknowing celebrities into adult video clips. By sharing the necessary code, widespread interest 
spawned in the Reddit community and led to an explosion of fake content. The first targets of 
deepfakes were famous people (we will explain later why), including actors (e.g., Emma Watson 
and Scarlett Johansson), singers (e.g., Katy Perry) and politicians (e.g., US presidents Obama 
and Trump), whose faces were transposed, without their permission, onto others. For example, 
one of the early deepfakes that showcased the power of AI and deep learning was 2017’s 
“Synthesizing Obama” (Suwajanakorn, Seitz, & Kemelmacher-Shlizerman, 2017), an impressive 
use of lip-syncing technology based on existing audio footage (for the curious reader, all videos 
referenced in this paper are listed and hyperlinked in Table 2). Today, we could be watching the 
leader of one country convincingly deliver a speech by the leader of another country, or vice 
versa. Deepfakes work for two main reasons: 
Believability: fake content is becoming more believable 
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The impact of deepfakes is significant because, although trust in photography has eroded over 
the past few decades thanks to image-editing technology (Westling, 2019), we still put a lot of 
stock into photographic evidence (Granot, Balcetis, Feigenson, & Tyler, 2018; Porter & 
Kennedy, 2012). We tend to put even more trust into the voices we know and the videos we 
watch (Brucato, 2015). The brain’s visual system, despite being largely robust in natural settings, 
can be targeted for misperception. Classic examples include optical illusions and bistable figures 
(e.g., the well-known Jastow rabbit-duck and Rubin vase-faces that can be viewed in two 
different ways – see Figure 1) (Kietzmann, Geuter, & König, 2011). The surprise and disbelief 
upon the ‘reveal’ of sleight-of-hand tricks confirms how much we trust our eyes – even if we 
know we are about to be fooled. If we see something with our own eyes, we believe it to exist or 
to be true, even if it is unlikely, as was the case with the deepfake examples at the beginning of 
this article.  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Discerning viewers of early deepfakes could often tell that the content had been altered. Today, 
only two years after the term deepfakes was coined, authentic and artificially-created videos are 
becoming harder and harder to distinguish. To illustrate deepfakes, a video referenced 
throughout this article is “Jim Carrey GLOWS”. The original shows an interview with Alison 
Brie, the lead actor from the Netflix series Glow, that originally aired on “Late Night with Seth 
Meyers”. In the deepfake, comedian Jim Carrey's face is imperceptibly replaced for Brie’s. In the 
ensuing discussions online, Carrey, despite having no part in the creation of this video, was even 
credited for his knack of impersonating others. Deepfakes are becoming much better and much 
more believable, fast.  
Accessibility: creating deepfakes is becoming easier 
Post-production work of a movie has long made fakes appear very realistic at the cinema. For 
example, “The Curious Case of Benjamin Button” won the 2009 Academy Award for Visual 
Effects. The movie relied on computer-generated imagery (CGI) to help tell the story of a baby 
born with the appearance and maladies of an elderly man, who then spends 84 years getting 
younger, metamorphizing into an infant. Creating such fakes requires expertise, extensive 
training, expensive hardware and special software, and each project (despite what the term CGI 
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suggests) is the result of labor-intensive work. However, tools of today, and certainly those of 
tomorrow, increasingly allow all of us to create fakes that appear real, without a significant 
investment into training, data collection, hardware and software. As a result, people without a lot 
of skill will soon be able to manipulate existing media or generate new content with relative 
ease. In 2018, the popular face-swapping program FakeApp still required large amounts of input 
data to generate deepfakes. In 2019, similar applications were already less demanding and more 
accessible. Zao, the popular Chinese app for mobile devices let users place their faces into scenes 
from hundreds of movies and TV shows, for free. All Zao required as source material was a 
series of selfies with specific facial expressions and head postures. A few clicks and seconds 
were all that was needed to put one’s face into a famous movie scene. Or, for those who disliked 
what someone said, products like Deepmind’s WaveNet can be used to generate realistic speech 
from text input. This can later be integrated with automated video editing to change the words 
coming right out of somebody’s mouth. Relatedly, Stanford researchers demonstrated text-to-
speech (TTS) editing of a talking-head video by changing Apple’s price per share in a video 
announcement simply by substituting a number in the text transcript (Fried et al., 2019). We can 
expect that the creation and distribution of such videos, and the resulting confusion and uproar, 
will only increase because the accessibility of technology necessary for creating high quality 
deepfakes continues to improve quickly. Likewise, social media platforms that provide 
organizations and individuals with the tools and technology to create and post content 
(Kietzmann, Hermkens, McCarthy, & Silvestre, 2011; Kietzmann, Silvestre, McCarthy, & Pit, 
2012) make it very easy to distribute deepfakes – one of the many dark sides of social media 
(Baccarella, Wagner, Kietzmann, & McCarthy, 2018). 
In combination, these developments drive the popularity and impact of deepfakes. Soon, 
everyone can choose to be the star of their favorite movie, possibly choosing their spouses, 
friends or colleagues as their romantic partners, allies or enemies in AI-manipulated movies. Or 
we can be placed, unwillingly, within highly undesirable movies, as keeps happening to 
celebrities, or can be seen and heard saying things we never said (e.g., sharing fake news about 
the companies we work for). Whether we want to or not, more and more deepfake images, audio 
and video will be created and shared. This is very alarming, and appropriate technological and 
societal countermeasures will be increasingly important and necessary, yet there are also 
potential benefits offered by deepfakes. In the following section, we provide a brief tour of the 
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most commonly used deepfake technique, before we highlight different types of deepfakes and 
how these impact individuals, organizations and governments. We conclude by suggesting the 
R.E.A.L. framework to manage deepfake risks. 
 
2. HOW DEEPFAKES WORK 
Before we embark on a discussion on how deepfakes work, we need to make clear that existing 
deepfake techniques and technologies are continuously changing, and entirely new ones are 
already emerging. The majority of current deepfakes in the visual domain follow a procedure in 
which the real face of a person is exchanged with a fake image showing somebody else. As an 
example of this, consider the images from the “Jim Carrey GLOWS” deepfake video mentioned 
above. Figure 2 shows a screenshot with Alison Brie from the original talk show interview on  
the left, and on the right is a frame from the resulting deepfake video featuring Brie’s body with 
Carrey’s face. We have chosen to use this example for three reasons. First, it shows a female and 
a male celebrity, both likely known to many readers. Second, the deepfake actually exists and 
readers can look at the original video and the deepfake output, to see for themselves how 
convincing the deepfake is. We ask the reader to do this so that our explanation of autoencoders 
is easier to follow. Third, compared to political deepfakes, this video’s content is not deeply 
controversial, and thus does not distract the reader’s attention from the process of creating a 
deepfake.  
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
To create this fake, three steps are taken (Figure 3). First, the image region showing Brie’s face 
is extracted from an original movie frame (Step 1). This image is then used as input to a deep 
neural network (DNN), a technique from the domain of machine learning and AI, which is used 
to automatically generate a matching image showing Carrey instead (Step 2). This generated face 
is then inserted into the original reference image to create the deepfake (Step 3). As can be seen 
from this three-step procedure, the central technical advance to deepfakes lies in Step 2, the 
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automated creation of fake facial images that match the original in all elements but the identity of 
the person shown. The process by which this is accomplished is explained next. 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
 
2. 1 Deep Learning for Deep Fakes 
As the name suggests, the main technological ingredient in creating deepfakes is deep learning, a 
machine learning technique from AI that can be used to train deep neural networks. Reminiscent 
of neurons in the brain, deep neural networks consist of a large set of interconnected artificial 
neurons, commonly referred to as units. Much like neurons in the brain, while each unit itself 
performs a rather simple computation, all units together can perform complex nonlinear 
operations, such as recognizing a specific person from seeing pixels on a screen (Kietzmann, 
McClure, & Kriegeskorte, 2018).  
In the brain, information flow (e.g., from seeing pixels on a screen to identifying a specific 
person) is regulated by the strength of the connections among neurons. To get better at a given 
task, the brain’s learning mechanisms operate on these connections, strengthening or weakening 
them as required to improve our task performance over time. Likewise, the computations of 
DNNs are dictated by the strength of the connection of their respective units. These connections, 
too, need to be trained. Untrained DNNs have random connections among units, which will lead 
to random information flow through the network and thereby to random output. For an untrained 
DNN operating on images of faces, all facial expressions are thereby arbitrary and 
indiscriminate, and correctly identifying a facial expression would only happen by chance. A 
trained DNN, on the other hand, will have improved the connection strength of the units and 
learned the underlying characteristics of a face. 
The goal of deep learning is therefore to update the connection strengths, or weights in DNN 
terminology, to optimize the information flow and output. This progressively drives the network 
output to minimize the errors that it makes. It achieves this by defining how the network should 
ideally respond in a variety of known conditions. For instance, when shown known input images, 
DNNs can be trained to adjust their weights to reduce detection errors, so they can eventually 
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identify and properly detect objects in the real world, estimate 3D depth from 2D images, and 
recognize digits and letters on bank cheques, license plates, tax forms, letters and so on. While 
the training process can lead to unprecedented task performance, it is data-hungry. Today’s deep 
learning requires millions of connection weights to be learned, which in turn necessitates large 
sets of training data. It is for this reason that, for the time being at least, mainly celebrities are 
targeted by deepfakes, of whom lots of images and videos exist to train the networks. 
2.2. The Autoencoder 
Now that the general procedure and the basic concepts of deep learning are explained, we can 
take a closer look at the process of creating deepfake content. To illustrate this process, we 
juxtapose what a DNN does when it creates a deepfake of facial image to what artists do when 
they draw a picture of a face. 
After looking at a number of photographs, artists often ‘get’ the people depicted and are able to 
draw pictures of them in novel scenarios. For this to succeed, artists learn to generate key 
characteristics of their photo reference, such as the smile, or the eye expressions (e.g., raising of 
eyebrows, or lowering of the head while looking up). This compression of the image into 
patterns and characteristics of the input is a result of the limited capacity of our brains to store 
visual information, and is needed for artists to create novel images beyond existing pictures. 
A deep network architecture that mimics a similar process to an artist making sense of a human’s 
face is an autoencoder (auto referring to the self, as in autobiography, not to automatic, as in 
autofocus). Based on a given, large set of input images, for example all showing Alison Brie, it is 
trained to recognize key characteristics of her face and subsequently recreate input images as its 
output. This process of first recognizing a comparably small number of facial characteristics in 
the input and from there to generate real-looking faces as output is accomplished in three 
subparts of autoencoders: an encoder, a latent space, and a decoder (see Figure 4). 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
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Encoder: Much like an artist drawing an image, the encoder goes through a similar process of 
compressing an image, from originally tens of thousands of pixels into a few hundred (typically 
around 300) measurements. These measurements relate to particular facial characteristics. They 
encode whether the eyes are open or closed, the head pose, the emotional expression, the eye 
expressions, ambient light, or skin colour, similar to the types of characteristics to which an artist 
may pay attention. The job of a successful encoder is to transfer an input image into these 300 
measurements. Put differently, the encoder part of an autoencoder network enables information 
to flow from a very detailed input image into what is known as a compressed information 
bottleneck, comprised of just 300 network units. The joint activity of these units signals the 
presence or absence of facial features in the input image. As an illustrative example, let us 
consider an encoder compressing the input into only two measurements and let us assume 
furthermore that they express the horizontal angle of the head and indicate whether a person is 
smiling or looking surprised. Provided with an input image, the encoder will yield two 
measurements (jointly encoding head orientation and emotion). These can be visualized as a 
point in a two-dimensional space where the intercept of the x- and the y-axis represent the two 
measurements. The space of all possible combinations of measurements of facial characteristics 
is known as latent space. For illustrative purposes, we explained a case of two measurements, but 
autoencoders for deepfakes use a far larger space of a few hundred measurements. 
Latent space: Latent spaces are often compared to information bottlenecks. For the autoencoder, 
this bottleneck is needed so that the network can learn more general facial characteristics rather 
than memorizing all input examples of specific people. The compression achieved by the 
encoding of an input image into the latent space is remarkable. If the latent space consisted of 
300 measurements, it would only require 0.1% of the memory needed to store the original input 
image. As noted previously, the latent space represents different facial aspects of the person on 
which it is trained. An autoencoder trained on images showing Alison Brie’s face, for instance, 
will learn to map a given input image of her into a latent space specifically representing her.  
Decoder: The path from the information bottleneck to the output has the task of re-creating an 
image from the latent space. It is known as the decoder. While the encoder’s job is to compress 
an input image into a set of only 300 measurements (a specific point in the latent space), the 
purpose of the decoder is to decompress this information to re-construct an image as truthfully as 
10 
 
possible. In our example, its job is to reconstruct the input image of Alison Brie from its 
representation in the latent space. The performance of the whole autoencoder network is 
measured by how much the input and generated (output) images resemble each other. 
In summary, the autoencoder (encoder, latent space and decoder) moves beyond existing image 
material and learns a generative model of a person’s face. As mentioned above, every point in the 
latent space corresponds to an image of a given person. An autoencoder trained on Brie includes 
a ‘Brie Decoder’ that can generate fake but eerily real-looking Brie images. The trouble, 
however, is that while the autoencoder can generate different faces from select points in latent 
space, we cannot simply instruct this ‘Brie Image Generator’ to create a smiling Brie, as we 
could instruct an artist to draw one. While all faces are points in the latent space (see Figure 5 for 
a 2D illustration), we don’t actually know which point in this vast space of nearly infinite 
possibilities will correspond to the image we desire. Solving this problem is the trick that makes 
deepfakes seem to be works of magic. 
2.3. The Deepfake Trick 
To identify specific images, we need a way to find the corresponding points in the latent space. 
The trick for creating deepfakes is to set up the structure of the autoencoder in a way that an 
image of another person can act as a guide to help find the specific combination of 300 
measurements that yields the desired image. If the trick works, one can use an image of Alison 
Brie as a guide, and subsequently generate a previously non-existent picture of Jim Carrey 
showing the same facial expression and head pose. Put differently, the input image acts as a 
reference point, similar to telling an artist to draw a picture of you but with the asymmetrical 
grin of actor Andy Samberg from sitcom Brooklyn Nine-Nine, or with Elvis Presley’s low riding 
eyelids and his slightly quizzical raised eyebrows.  
The trick that makes this possible lies in using the same ‘shared encoder’ for both people. In the 
encoding process, the DNN selects 300 measurements it deems meaningful based on the training 
images for each person. If images of two people are compressed on separate encoders (Figure 5), 
different features would be seen as meaningful and we could not combine them in a valuable 
way (the red and blue dots in Figure 5 do not line up). 
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The autoencoder trick is to train two autoencoders, each with a person-specific decoder, but both 
using the exact same encoder. This encoder will learn to use general features that the faces of 
both people have in common (Figure 5, right panel). This allows for similar pictures of two 
different people to be positioned in a similar location of the latent space. For example, pictures 
showing either a smiling Carrey or Brie will lead to very similar measurements, or unit 
activations, in the latent space. 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
Similar measurements resulting from images of two separate people are the key to understanding 
deepfakes. They allow us to transform a picture showing the face of one person (e.g., Brie) into 
showing somebody else (e.g., Carrey). The resulting image will be 100% fake, but the generated 
face will exhibit the same emotional expression, head posture, etc. as shown in the original input 
image. This new image can then be doctored back into the original image to create a fake scene. 
 
3. TYPES OF DEEPFAKES 
AI-based tools to create fake content, like all technologies, will progress sharply from their early 
incubation stage to a period of rapid growth and increased performance. As summarized in Table 
1, a variety of deepfakes and potential business applications will emerge as their underlying 
techniques approach maturity.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
4. THE IMPACT OF DEEPFAKES ON INDIVIDUALS, ORGANIZATIONS AND GOVERNMENTS 
Most of the examples discussed in this article present a very gloomy look at society and how we 
are currently using deepfakes to fool and potentially exploit others. Unfortunately, that’s how 
technology is often first used. Technological progress, it seems, promotes the good and bad in 
people - moving us forward and backward at the same time. Deepfakes are no exception, and like 
other technologies, will have a bright side and a dark side (see: Baccarella et al., 2018). Thus, we 
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next balance our discussion by outlining several bright and dark opportunities that deepfakes 
offer to individuals, organizations and government. We then present a framework for how 
decision-makers, technologists, leaders of social media platforms and policymakers could deal 
with the challenges of the dark side of deepfakes. 
As individuals, we might soon enjoy injecting ourselves into Hollywood movies, and be the 
hero(ine) in the games we play on our phones or game consoles. Instead of going to the store, we 
might ‘deepfake ourselves’ by sharing our photos (and eventually, our personal decoders) in 
order to create virtual mannequins that model different outfits on us. It’s the ultimate 
personalization (Dietmar, 2019). We might like the entertaining side of deepfakes, too, for 
instance the Brie/Carrey face-swap or the many deepfakes featuring Nicolas Cage in various 
Hollywood scenes. In these early days of deepfakes, their quality and believability and their 
strangeness and newness make these videos engaging and enjoyable. 
While these examples of deepfakes are not inherently malicious or created with the intention of 
causing harm, they are also not victimless crimes. After all, celebrities did not consent to being 
portrayed in the deepfakes and might object to them strongly. The same technology that made 
the Carrey/Brie face-swap entertaining, for instance, was used, time and again, to transplant the 
face of Scarlett Johansson and many of her famous colleagues onto the bodies of actors in adult 
videos. The harm this can do to us all becomes even clearer in the case of then-18-year old 
Noelle Martin, an ordinary, non-famous citizen, who one day discovered hundreds of explicit 
deepfake images and videos with her face on the bodies of porn actresses (Melville, 2019). These 
deepfakes not only put her reputation at risk, but also her emotional well-being, her career 
prospects as an aspiring lawyer and her physical safety. With such a powerful technology, and 
the increasing number of images and videos of all of us on social media, everyone can become a 
target for online harassment, defamation, revenge porn, identity theft and bullying – all using 
deepfakes.  
For organizations, deepfakes have pros and cons, too. The upsides can, once again, be found in 
the entertainment and fashion industries where celebrities can simply make their personal deep 
network models available so that deepfake footage can be created without the need for travel to a 
video shoot, for example. Hollywood will be an early adopter. Certainly, face-swapping (aka 
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face-leasing) and voice dubbing will be popular, so that movie or advertising producers can fix 
misspoken lines or make script changes without re-recording footage, and create seamless dubs 
of actors speaking different languages. More realistic stunt doubles can be created and actors can 
look older or younger with the use of deepfakes instead of time-consuming make-up. 
In terms of the negative impact of deepfakes for organizations, technological advancements 
often make incumbents redundant. For example, the entire dubbing and re-voicing industry, 
which has long translated movies so that the new words match the original lip movement of the 
actor, is endangered and at risk of becoming extinct now that languages and lips can be changed. 
Such industry developments are evolutionary. In terms of dark sides of deepfakes, we predict 
that in the early days, many unsuspecting firms will fall victim to trickery. There will likely also 
be many organizations that will suffer from deepfake news releases. Videos deliberately stating 
false earnings estimates will hurt stock prices and deepfake videos showing CEOs in 
compromising situations will impact their firms’ reputation, and put stakeholder agreements at 
risk, to name just a couple of examples. Then of course there are lots of opportunities for 
‘algorithmic blackmail’, where managers are offered a choice to either pay a fee to stop a 
deepfake from being shared or suffer the very public consequences.  
For governments, the bright potential of deepfakes lies in the ability to communicate with 
various stakeholders in a way that is accessible to them. For instance, a public service 
announcement can be broadcast in a number of different languages, much like a consensual 
deepfake in which football celebrity David Beckham advocates in nine different languages and 
voices to end malaria. At the same time, the dark side of deepfakes is undeniably powerful, with 
the potential to give the average person the ability to create and distribute well-timed acts of 
sabotage. A government leader could be shown covering up a misdeed or making racist remarks 
just before an election or a major decision. Further, deepfake technology “will be irresistible for 
nation states to use in disinformation campaigns to manipulate public opinion, deceive 
populations and undermine confidence in […] institutions.” (Riechmann, 2018). Deepfake 
propaganda and election meddling, and the disinformation they seed threaten efficient 
governance for all democracies, if not democracy itself. 
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5. THE R.E.A.L. FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING DEEPFAKE RISKS 
As this article showed, the potential for dark, malicious, deceptive and destructive potential of 
deepfakes for individuals, organizations (and brands) and governments outweighs the bright 
opportunities for thoughtful, sincere and constructive applications today. We hope we motivated 
managers to think about how deepfakes can transform their businesses in positive ways. More 
importantly, we urge all decision-makers, including technologists, leaders of social media 
platforms, and policymakers to help organizations, and in turn society, prevent and mitigate the 
dark side of content manipulation. With this goal in mind, we propose a R.E.A.L. framework for 
managing deepfake risks: Record original content, Expose deepfakes early, Advocate for legal 
protection and Leverage trust (See Figure 6). 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
 
Record original content to assure deniability 
As dark deepfakes often seek to falsely portray somebody doing or saying something and being 
somewhere, the exposure of such fakes would require evidence to the contrary. Providing this 
data is referred to as an ‘alibi service’ or a ‘life log’ (Chesney & Citron, 2019). It involves a form 
of technology tracking and logging a person’s life in terms of location, communications and 
activities. Despite the potentially negative impact on privacy, from a technology perspective, the 
availability of mobile, wearable and smart Internet-of-Things devices makes collecting such data 
possible to some extent. The data could then be encrypted, stored and used to help identify and 
expose the posting of dark deepfakes. A related technological approach to managing and limiting 
the dark deepfakes is to develop ways and practices for authenticating genuine content. Consider 
for example a technology called Amber Authenticate, which works on devices that produce 
genuine photographic, audio and video content in real time, as the content is recorded. It creates 
a 'truth layer' that is original content, cryptographically stamped with numerous digital 
fingerprints and then archived on a public blockchain. This fingerprinting of digital content is 
used to track its provenance as it is distributed and to help detect and respond to attempts to 
produce unwanted manipulations of the original content. 
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Expose dark deepfakes early  
The international professional services firm KPMG advises that “establishing a governance 
framework that embraces disruptive technologies and encourages innovation while ensuring risks 
are identified and managed is essential to an organization’s ability to survive and thrive in a 
digital world” (Lageschulte, 2019). Thus, just as we adopt and develop the technological 
innovations that gave us deepfakes, there are technological innovations being developed to detect 
and classify deepfakes. This includes using AI techniques to identify resolution inconsistencies, 
the scaling, rotation and splicing of content that is often central to the creation of a deepfake and 
the eye blinking patterns of the human images. Such detection innovation is helped by national 
institutions such as the US’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) which has 
a Media Forensics program, as well as fake-spotter services like Truepic (Hatmaker, 2018). 
Facebook, too, is investing significant resources into deepfake identification and detection 
(O'Brien, 2018). Yet, despite such initiatives, it is important to recognize that this a game of cat 
and mouse with improvements in detection technology having to keep pace with improvements 
in deepfake production technology. 
Advocate for legal protection 
With deepfakes, deepfake instigators could include ex-partners or bullies (for social impacts), 
disgruntled employees or competitors (for organizations), and politically-motivated actors and 
even nation-state attackers (for governments), among others. Social media networks, and their 
involvement in deepfakes needs to be revisited in this light, too. Are Facebook, YouTube and the 
like merely technology platforms, or in fact publishers that should be held liable for the content 
on their sites, including deepfakes? Are they willingly supporting deepfakes? As informed 
distributors, are they (or should they be) seen as guilty themselves? The underlying legislation 
(e.g., Section 230 of the US Communications Decency Act) currently does not offer such 
provisions for distributor liability for technology platforms, even in cases when platforms 
possess direct knowledge of the illegal comments and fail to act once made aware of them. Point 
in case, in response to the 2018 doctored video that made House Speaker Nancy Pelosi appear to 
be slurring her speech (not a deepfake), Facebook said: “We don’t have a policy that stipulates 
that the information you post on Facebook must be true” (Chu, 2019). In contrast, when 
bookstores are credibly informed that a book they sell includes libelous content but fail to act, 
they can be held liable (Candeup, 2019). At a time of deepfakes, such statements by social media 
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executives and the existing laissez-faire approach of today’s legal frameworks should concern us 
all. Victims should have legal recourse in instances of defamation, malice, breaches of privacy or 
emotional distress from a deepfake, and in cases of copyright infringements, impersonation and 
fraud involving deepfakes. However, there are few legal tools that address these deepfake threats 
today, and we hope that this article motivates many to advocate and lobby for legal changes that 
reflect the most recent technological threats.  
Leverage trust 
As managers who want to act proactively, the best way forward might be to strengthen brands 
and the relationships between brands and their customers. This means ensuring products perform 
well and are consistent with what their brands promise. While this advice may sound simplistic, 
how many brands do we know that promise more than they deliver? We posit that, in the chase 
for market share and visibility, some brands have forgotten these fundamentals. Likewise, brands 
that provide superior value build trust and commitment in their customer relationships, with 
customers establishing lasting emotional bonds with them (Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Sashi, 2012). 
Such strong brands will be better positioned to weather deepfake assaults, as their stakeholders 
will defend the brand (Pongsakornrungsilp & Schroeder, 2011; Punjaisri & Wilson, 2017) or at 
least put more trust into the brand than into what they see or hear from a suspect video. When 
brands that are built on strong ethics are portrayed in an unfavorable light in deepfakes, the hope 
is that stakeholders will not simply believe their eyes and ears, but be more critical and think for 
themselves.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
As noted at the beginning of this article, analog and digital content manipulations are not new, 
and the act of doctoring content is as old as the media industry itself. However, recent 
developments in the use of deep learning mark the beginning of a next phase of content 
doctoring. Novel and publicly available tools now enable the semi-automated creation of much 
improved and more convincing fakes. We provided a working definition of deepfakes and 
explained how they function. This involved explaining how deepfakes are currently produced 
using a deep network structure called an autoencoder which, much like an artificial artist, learns 
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to concentrate on key characteristics of a person’s face to generate previously non-existent 
images. We then provided a typology including image, audio, video, and audio/video deepfakes 
and described possible business applications for each. Deepfakes have a bright and dark side and 
we identified their implications for individuals, organizations and governments. Finally, we 
presented the R.E.A.L. framework to help decision-makers, technologists, leaders of social 
media platforms and policymakers understand how to counter the dark side of deepfakes. This is 
an important contribution for, as Amara’s law states, we tend to overestimate the effect of a 
technology in the short run and underestimate the effect in the long run. Certainly, in the short 
run, we are likely going to see a wave of deepfake videos, movies and apps. The timing is perfect 
- at a time of much-touted fake news, deepfakes will add a very powerful tool to fool voters, 
buyers, and competitors, among others. Some might be intended for entertainment purposes, 
while others might impact the outcome of an election or the stock market. As more of our lives is 
constantly being captured and shared, e.g., through social media, we provide more and more data 
about ourselves, which will also be used to train DNNs, with or without our explicit permission. 
With this greater understanding of deepfakes, our hope is that we will all be more prepared to 
counter the deepfake tricks as we appreciate its treats. 
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Figure 1: Bistable figures: your brain decides what you perceive 
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Figure 2: A deepfake featuring Jim Carrey and Alison Brie 
  
Original showing Alison Brie Deepfake showing Jim Carrey instead of Brie
23 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Three-step procedure to creating deepfakes 
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Figure 4: Autoencoder: a DNN architecture commonly used for generating deepfakes 
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Figure 5: Illustrative example of an autoencoder latent space trained on faces. 
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Figure 6: The R.E.A.L. Framework for managing deepfake risks 
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Type Description Current example Business application 
Ph
ot
o 
de
ep
fa
ke
s 
 
Face and body-swapping 
Making changes to a face, 
replacing or blending the 
face (or body) with someone 
else’s face (or body) 
 
FaceApp’s aging filter alters 
your photo to show how you 
might look decades from now 
(Kaushal, 2019). 
 
Consumers can virtually 
try on cosmetics, eye 
glasses, hairstyles or 
clothes. 
A
ud
io
 d
ee
pf
ak
es
 
Voice-swapping 
Changing a voice or 
imitating someone else’s 
voice 
 
Fraudsters used AI to mimic a 
CEO’s voice and then tricked a 
manager into transferring 
$243,000 (Supasorn 
Suwajanakorn, 2017). 
 
The voice of an audio 
book narration can sound 
younger, older, male, or 
female and with different 
dialects or accents to take 
on different characters.  
Text to Speech  
Changing audio in a 
recording by typing in new 
text 
 
Users could make 
controversial Dr. Jordan B. 
Peterson a famous professor of 
psychology and author say 
anything they wanted, until his 
threat of legal action shut the 
site NotJordanPeterson down 
(Cole, 2019).  
 
Misspoken words or a 
script change in a 
voiceover can be replaced 
without making a new 
recording. 
V
id
eo
 d
ee
pf
ak
es
 
Face-swapping  
Replacing the face of 
someone in a video with the 
face of someone else 
 
Jim Carrey’s face replaces 
Alison Brie’s in “Late 
Night with Seth Meyers” 
interview. 
 
Face-swapped video can 
be used to put the leading 
actor’s face onto the body 
of a stunt double for more 
realistic-looking action 
shots in movies. 
Face-morphing 
A face changes into another 
face through a seamless 
transition 
 
 
Former “Saturday Night Live” 
star Bill Hader imperceptibly 
morphs in and out of Arnold 
Schwarzenegger in the talk 
show Conan.  
 
Video game players can 
insert their faces onto that 
of their favorite 
characters. 
Full body puppetry 
Transposing the movement 
from one person’s body to 
that of another  
 
 “Everybody dance now” 
shows how anyone can look 
like a professional dancer. 
 
Business leaders and 
athletes can hide physical 
ailments during a video 
presentation. 
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Lip-syncing 
Changing the mouth 
movements and words 
spoken in a talking head 
video  
 
In “You Won’t Believe What 
Obama Says In This Video!” 
Jordan Peele edits Obama to 
use profanity in a Public 
Service Announcement. 
 
Ads and instructional 
videos can be ‘translated’ 
into other languages in the 
same voice used in the 
original language. 
 
Table 1: Types and examples of Deepfakes 
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Video Title  URL 
Original: Alison Brie Snagged Her GLOW Role by 
Freestyling about Lady Parts 
https://www.youtube.com/watch
?v=QBmYDzLhWoY 
Deepfake: Jim Carrey GLOWS https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b5AWhh6MYCg 
A world without Facebook https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=343812022777503 
Bill Hader impersonates Arnold Schwarzenegger 
[DeepFake] 
https://www.youtube.com/watch
?v=bPhUhypV27w&feature=yo
utu.be 
David Beckham speaks nine languages to launch Malaria 
Must Die Voice Petition https://youtu.be/QiiSAvKJIHo  
Everybody Dance Now https://youtu.be/PCBTZh41Ris  
Ryan Reynolds & the Chocolate Factory https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3qTXIwjAUZM 
Synthesizing Obama: Learning Lip Sync from Audio https://youtu.be/9Yq67CjDqvw 
Text-based Editing of Talking-head Video (SIGGRAPH 
2019) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch
?v=0ybLCfVeFL4&feature=you
tu.be  
You Won’t Believe What Obama Says In This Video! https://youtu.be/cQ54GDm1eL0 
 
Table 2: Links to the videos referenced in this article 
 
 
